Kony 2012 : Viral propaganda ?

On 5th March 2012, a video posted on YouTube started to attract millions of viewers. The 30-minute film, entitled “Kony 2012”, denounces Joseph Kony’s crimes in Uganda, notably the abduction of children to make them soldiers. It is a call for worldwide mobilisation in order to eventually arrest and bring “the world’s worst war criminal” to the International Criminal Court, through the support of politicians and “culturemakers”. The video (the 12th of its kind) was made by Invisible Children (IC),an American non-profit campaigning organization founded in 2004 by three young Americans, including Jason Russell, who is also the narrator and main protagonist in the video. Invisible Children’s general aim is to raise awareness about the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and its leader Joseph Kony.

After going ‘viral’ in just a few days, the campaign has been increasingly criticized, thus prompting a heated debate among proponents and opponents of the message delivered by the film as well as of the methods employed to do so. The debate extended in several directions, but either way,one fact remains undeniable: Kony 2012 was the fastest-spreading video of all time. And from that conclusion, two main questions arise. First, is this a turning point, the birth of a new cyber strategy to mobilize the masses? Does it have to do with empowering the people –or brainwashing them? And second, is good intention enough to justify any action?

The birth of a new cyber strategy?

We can criticize many aspects of the Kony 2012 campaign, but one thing cannot be denied: it is efficient and powerful. One need only look at a few figures. According to Vimeo, the video was played 58,000 times on March 5th; on March 12th, the Kony campaign had generated 112 million views, from over 750 clips across the Internet, including translated and subtitled versions in French,Spanish, Italian and Chinese. It is an unprecedented event in the history of YouTube videos and in the longer history of ‘awareness campaigns’, insofar as it spread quicker than any other video before, being reposted,retweeted and reblogged throughout the web.

Is it, however, an entirely new phenomenon? The way it was able to move people all over the(Western) world reminds us of previous episodes that marked the media and aid agencies’communication strategies. The Buerk report on the Ethiopian famine in 1984, for instance, triggered colossal support for this Eastern African humanitarian crisis, which was sustained through Bob Geldof’s active Live Aid campaign and through continuous media attention devoted to it. It could therefore be argued that IC only adapted that successful recipe to the modern era, using the new technology and social networks available.

Screenshot taken from the original Kony 2012 movie.

Keep it simple, keep it strong

Indeed, if we take a closer look at what makes the video so persuasive, it appears that even though the means of communication differ, many elements are of a similar nature. Firstly, the Kony video,just like the Buerk report, greatly simplifies the issue. The famine in Ethiopia was said to be caused by drought, but such sketchy explanation overlooked the complicated political and economic factors that participated in or at least aggravated the famine. Similarly, the 2012 video is quite crude: it frames the issue in terms of good versus evil, and portrays Joseph Kony as ‘The Bad Guy’, without giving much background information or historical analysis of the conflict. This is, obviously, a good way to get a message across to an audience as wide as possible. Indeed, in order to reach thousands of people from different backgrounds, one needs to find the lowest common denominators, thefew basic elements that can be understood by everyone. Or rather, that can appeal to everyone’s emotions.

This is precisely the second trait shared by the famine report and the Kony video. Both were cleverly designed to appeal to our human feelings. What do the crying woman holding an emaciated child in her arms and Jacob Acaye, the former child soldier who became Jason Russell’s protégé 3 havein common? Why is the film so extensively featuring Jason Russell’s 4-year-old son Gavin?

An in-depth analysis of a conflict (even filled with impressive numbers of the people affected by it) will never match the passionate effect that a video actually showing the dire consequences of that conflict on a few people, because the former appealsprincipally to reason, rather than to emotions. The feelings that immediately arise when watching the suffering of human beings that could be ourselves or members of our families are compelling ones: empathy, compassion, sadness, and finally horror and outrage. Whether it is Africans dying of hunger in Ethiopia nearly 30 years ago or Africans abducted and abused by a cruel warlord in Uganda, the rationale is the same: “look at how sad their situation is!”

Peace is only a click away

Invisible Children goes even further. They have so acutely defined their target –namely, student sand young adults living in the Western world— that they have managed to create a video that responds to its need: the need to fight for a common cause, or, in other words, the universal desire to belong, to feel part of a greater community. The previous generation had the Vietnam War or May 68, the “make love not war” motto, but what can the new generation stand for?

And the steps to make this world more peaceful are served on a platter. In the past, the only way to feel like you were making a difference without moving from your living room was to donate money to a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO). The Kony 2012 campaign does not neglect this old but efficient tool: the video encourages donations of money and elegantly urges its viewers to casually “get” action kits –for to “buy” them would clearly be a consumerist attitude, miles away from the altruist and disinterested path followed by IC.

But the video goes beyond this traditional “watch-and-donate” approach. Indeed, and this is a modern-day factor that has enabled the video to go viral, there is a whole new array of handy tool sat the disposal of the idealist viewer. This, rather than the emotional appeal, is what is new about this campaign: a widespread “watch-and-click” approach which encompasses all the wonderful things that clicking can do. Wannabe activists are indeed only a few clicks away from changing the world. There are plenty of options, from online donations, ordering Kony posters and bracelets, tweeting at politicians or celebrities through the IC website, to, of course, sharing the video (and your enlightening thoughts on the matter while you are at it) on YouTube, Twitter, Facebook or your blog.

This whole mechanism is in no way due to chance; it has been carefully planned for just that purpose,even though it has been successful at a scale probably never envisaged by its designers. The video is explicit, showing that “turning the system upside-down” is “changing everything”. The idea is simple,and that makes it brilliant: reversing the top-down pyramid where the elite impose their will on the people, and finally giving a voice to the silent, yet well-intentioned, masses. This is not the only type of rebellion against the current system of decision-making in which people often feel powerless,as the Indignados and Occupy Wall Street movements (among many others around the world) demonstrate. Thus, the video perfectly fits into the present atmosphere and manages to appeal to people’s eagerness for change.

Empowering the people –or brainwashing them?

At this point, however, one could legitimately wonder if there is anything wrong with such a strategy.Isn’t it nice to revive the idea of a shared humanity in young people’s minds? Isn’t it great that technology and the Internet make it possible to finally do something, and to do so quickly? Well, this is where it gets tricky, for several reasons.

First, even though the video is unambiguous about its bottom-up method to empower the people and to get governments’ attention, it is far more ambivalent about the justification behind the solution proposed. In fact, the justification is pretty much absent. The oversimplified narrative about how arresting Joseph Kony should be the world’s number one priority cannot constitute a validation of the suggested further steps, namely, sending American troops to capture him. Promoting such an action is not something that should be taken lightly, for it involves human lives and is likely to have huge consequences on the ground, notably on child soldiers themselves. Whether or not the Kony 2012 campaign is actually capable of achieving its objective is another issue, and it should not prevent us from analysing the primary aim of the video.

So, basically, if one ends up approving the message of the video, it means that implicitly, one agrees with two underlying premises: 1) Mr Kony is THE bad guy, and arresting him would be THE solution;and 2) In order to do so Uganda needs the help of the United States, and more precisely, a US military intervention. That would not be such a big problem in itself, if this was clearly expressed and justified in the video, because it would mean that people who then take further action do so with full knowledge of the situation. This is, however, clearly not the case with the Kony campaign. No one can fully understand the complex situation of that African region, let alone make an informed decision on whether US intervention would be beneficial, just by watching the half hour video. Granted, people could do more research on their own, and then weigh up the pro and cons. But how many will do so before reposting the video or before buying action kits?

The emotional power of the video, its design, music and trendy look are all crafted to move people in such a way that they will want to take an active part in this charitable movement, and will likely participate in the propagation of the video before knowing better. Thus it seems that the very quality of the video –its capacity to carry a strong message and to convince viewers of its trustworthiness- is also what can be criticized about it, and what makes it dangerous, because it could (does?) lead millions of people to hastily support potentially unwise actions. This is especially remarkable at a time where military interventions by the US in the past and in the present are actually strongly contested. Just look at Iraq, where the US went after the “bad guy” Saddam Hussein…

A revolution …but for whom?

Second, the claim that this re-empowering of the masses constitutes a revolution can be criticized. As TMS Ruge explains, social networks and new media have indeed been used to give a voice to the people, for instance during the Arab Spring, but what is happening with Kony 2012 is something very different. It is giving power to outsiders, as opposed to victims of the LRA themselves. Thousands of Americans and Europeans now feel like they have the capacity to change things in a remote African country, without knowing many details about it, but people actually living there are not made more active actors of their destiny. But “empowering” Westerns rather than Africans is unfortunately not a new trend…

Let’s bring the White men’s guns

This is where the third problematic underlying assumption comes in. It is the sadly still common subconscious belief that Africa is a helpless continent, ridden with tribal conflicts and desperately in need of American or European rescue, be it intelligence, democratic ‘models’, aid or readymade solutions to long-term problems [1]. Many journalists and academics contend that the tone of the video echoes the tone of colonial discourses and that the White Man’s Burden has simply been updated in the form of a “White Savior Industrial Complex” (Teju Cole on Twitter). Even though IC may not have purportedly exploited the colonial legacy of a supposed Western superiority, it is still undeniable that the whole campaign is based on an unquestioned assumption that makes the message readily accepted: doing something for Uganda is better than doing nothing.

But is it? Again, any argument can be accepted as long as it is rationally developed and defended, but it is not the case with this video. Nowhere does the video justify its position by stating that for example all other initiatives to bring peace have failed. Nowhere do they bring proof that their solution is based on extended study of the conflict, or that such solution is backed by Ugandan academics, specialists of the LRA or expert in conflict-resolution. All in all, what is lacking is a justification as to why them, young Americans founders of IC, know better than everybody else.

What is wrong with good intention?

A common reaction to that criticism is that it all stems for altruistic intention and that at least, now people know who Kony is, and everyone is talking about it. This is true, but one could easily counter argue, so what? Watching videos on YouTube and expressing sadness and outrage on Facebook will not change anything for people caught up in conflicts in Uganda or elsewhere. As David Rieff [2] puts it, sympathy for a cause is very different from understanding, and can even distort it. And only knowledge and full comprehension could help find a solution for that sort of on-going multifaceted conflict. Unfortunately, Kony 2012 raises strong emotions rather than rigorous awareness, and fails to take into account the efforts made by countless specialists and activists on the ground.

But to finish on a positive note, one must admit that there is something rather encouraging in the unfolding of the Kony 2012 campaign. The very media that enabled the video to go viral also enabled web surfers to quickly balance the somewhat naïve immediate appraisal of the campaign. The video was viewed by millions of people, but those among them who felt uneasy about such a massive craze were able to post links to critical website and blog articles, thus leading to an increasingly constructive debate. Likewise, innumerable journal articles reported the bandwagon in a discerning way, warning people of rushed conclusions and reviving the wider discussion on aid, and notably the adverse effect that Western aid can sometimes have in countries where it pledges to improve the situation.

A KONY 2012 poster in Austin, Texas (Robert Raines on flickr)

The next thing to watch for in this affair is April 20th, as it has been programmed by Invisible Children as “Cover the night”, in other words the night when “ the conversation [will move] from the digital to the physical world” and “where real change can be made”, according to IC website. Supporters of the campaign are expected to get out and cover city walls with pop-art posters portraying a stylised Joseph Kony, thus finally making him “famous”. The images promoting that even in the video cannot help but remind us of the excellent German film “The Wave” (directed by Denis Gansel in 2008) in which hordes of conditioned teenagers covered their city with stickers and graffiti representing the new movement that had brainwashed them. We have yet to see how many people will take part in the Kony 2012 happening, given the rapid pace at which the once viral attention faded away.

But frankly, the rapid disengagement of people might just be the most reassuring aspect of the new social media, proving that a viral campaign that presents so many flaws cannot be sustained in the long run. Even though Invisible Children has proven that an ingenious video can strike the Facebook world for a few days, it seems that the “make blog not war” movement has not yet converted everyone to the simplistic White Savior ideology.

Notes

[1] The video overlooks long-term problems present in many African country, and in which the West is often not blameless given its colonial antecedents and most of all its active protection of a world economic and political system that allows conflicts and inequalities to be sustained (See for example Pogge, Thomas.2001. Priorities of Global Justice. Metaphilosophy 32, nos. 1-2: 6-24).

[2] See Reiff, David. 2002. A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis. London: Vintage.

Kalachnikovs : entre mythe et contrefaçons

Elle est de tous les conflits actuels, véritable figure de proue de l’industrie d’armement Soviétique. Mise en service pour le compte de l’armée Rouge dans les années 50, la Kalachnikov, dont le modèle dérivé le plus connu reste l’AK-47, a traversé les plateaux humides Vietnamiens jusqu’aux guerres civiles africaines endémiques, en passant par les champs de pavot du sud de l’Afghanistan.

Toutefois, après ces bons et loyaux services, tant dans les rébellions civiles que dans les armées de plus d’une soixantaine de pays, l’histoire de la Kalachnikov, que l’on croyait immortelle, connaît plusieurs essoufflements. Ceux-ci sont principalement dus à ce qui l’a élevé au rang de première arme utilisée dans le monde : sa qualité (on est loin du concept d’obsolescence programmée). En effet, cette arme est un bijou de robustesse (plongée dans l’eau ou dans le sable, elle ne s’enraye pas!). Simple d’utilisation, elle possède un autre atout majeur : son faible prix, dû à un coût de production abaissé au maximum en raison de l’utilisation de matériaux bons marchés (plastique, bois et métal pour les premières versions).

A ce jour, la Kalachnikov demeure de loin l’arme la plus connue et la plus représentée dans l’imaginaire collectif en raison de son utilisation dans l’ensemble des conflits depuis plus d’un demi siècle. Néanmoins, cette notoriété est également liée au fait qu’elle est de loin l’arme la plus copiée et dérivée. Bienvenue dans un monde où industrie d’armement rime souvent avec contrefaçons.

Des ateliers d’Izhmash au mythe Kalash.

C’est en 1947, après une longue convalescence post-seconde guerre mondiale que Mikhaïl Kalachnikov présente à l’Armée Rouge, dans les ateliers d’Izhmash dans l’Oural, un nouveau fusil automatique : « l’Avtomat Kalachnikova 1947″ (Kalachnikov Automatique 1947), dont l’histoire ne retiendra que l’acronyme : AK-47. Dès cette date, l’armée soviétique fait de la Kalachnikov le fusil réglementaire de son infanterie motorisée. Ce n’est que quelques années plus tard, à la suite de plusieurs modifications liée au poids et à son maniement, qu’elle l’adopte dans tous ses corps d’armée.

Sa robustesse, sa légèreté et son faible coup de production vont en faire peu à peu l’arme la plus utilisée dans le monde, grâce à un conflit majeur qui va ébranler le monde pendant plusieurs dizaines d’années : la guerre froide. Chacun des partenaires stratégiques du bloc soviétique vont acheter des licences de production de Kalachnikov, portant à plusieurs dizaines millions les armes en circulation estampillées “Kalachnikov”, en quelques années seulement. La Kalashnikov, arme mondiale et mondialisée, inonde également les photographies des différents conflits, devenant une véritable allégorie de la guerre, et même un symbole de liberté pour les révolutionnaires de nombreux pays. Elle sera dérivée en plusieurs versions au fil des années et des conflits, adoptant plusieurs calibres pour répondre à la demande émanant du monde entier, passant du 7.62 originel au célèbre 5,56 OTAN.

AK-47 dans sa version de base (1956)

Aujourd’hui, le nombre d’exemplaires vendus de l’arme devenue légende atteint les 70 millions d’unités . Elle est l’arme la plus vendue et la plus meurtrière de tous les temps. Toutefois, son créateur ne reçu jamais d’argent malgré les prouesses économiques de son bijou. Encore aujourd’hui, plusieurs usines et fabricants d’armes tirent pourtant parti du formidable emballement pour cette arme et ce grâce à des copies toujours plus nombreuses.

Sa contrefaçon : le symbole d’une reconnaissance ?

Mikhaïl Kalachnikov lui-même a estimé en 2007 que 9 Kalachnikov sur 10 présentées comme telles étaient de simples copies, issues de pays ayant – pour certains – possédé des licences de production de l’arme par le passé. En effet, afin de produire une arme dans un pays, l’industrie du pays demandeur doit acheter une licence de production, qui équivaut à un transfert de technologie, valable plusieurs années. Cela est très commun lors de la conclusion de gros contrats, tels que récemment la possible vente du Rafale à l’Inde (une vingtaine d’avions produits sur les chaines d’assemblage de Dassault contre une centaine en Inde chez HAL – Hindustan Aeronautics Limited).

Ainsi, lors de la guerre froide, l’URSS a vendu des licences de production de Kalachnikovs à l’ensemble de ses partenaires stratégiques. Cependant, après la chute du Bloc Soviétique, une redistribution des cartes fut faite. Tout d’abord, les arsenaux de l’Union Soviétique furent dispersés dans le monde entier grâce aux marchands de mort, qui n’hésitaient pas à vendre des armes et munitions à tous les belligérants, sans distinction idéologique, contournant au passage les différents embargos. La demande d’armes fut beaucoup plus faible que le nombre d’armes sur le marché et les pays possédant des licences devenaient des rivaux de premiers plan face à la Russie dans la production de ce type d’armement.

Ce n’est qu’en marge d’un forum sur les armes légères organisé par l’OSCE en 2006 à Vienne que la Russie a enfin dénoncé ouvertement les contrefaçons de son arme. Le pays des Tsars revendiquait alors seulement 10 à 12% de la production annuelle de Kalachnikovs à l’intérieur de ses frontières, le reste étant réparti entre d’anciens détenteurs de licences officielles. Ainsi, 9 Kalachnikovs sur 10 seraient le fruit de productions étrangères à la Russie, dont beaucoup ne détiendraient plus de licences de production.

Aujourd’hui, on ne dénombre pas moins de 63 dérivés plus ou moins réussis de la Kalachnikov, produits pour la plupart à l’étranger. Certaines ressemblances sont plus que frappantes, tant sur le plan visuel que technique, telles que les séries WASR réalisées en roumaine, le Zastava M70 serbe ou le Type 81 chinois. Ces derniers modèles sont tous issus de licences vendues par l’URSS à ses alliés durant la seconde partie du XXe siècle. La Bulgarie illustre plus que tout autre pays ce problème de continuité de production après expiration des licences. C’est dans les années 90 que les licences possédées par la société Arsenal ont expiré. Toutefois, possédant toujours des chaînes de production, elle ne s’est pas privée pour continuer la production/conception de Kalachnikovs, expédiant son produit majoritairement en Afrique alors que la licence initiale prévoyait seulement une production pour sa propre armée.

En 2009, un des représentants de la société d’Izhmash évoquait dans les colonnes du journal britannique The Independant un manque à gagner pour l’industrie russe de 400 millions de dollars par an environ. Face à cette fuite, Рособоронэкспорт – régulateur des exportations et les ventes de licences pour le complexe militaro-industriel russe – a élevé le ton contre ses anciens partenaires stratégiques pour demander des comptes sur la production de copies de Kalachnikovs. Toutefois, les efforts de Рособоронэкспорт se révèlent aujourd’hui vains, et des pays exportateurs de copies – en grande partie d »Europe de l’Est – demandent à ce que les négociations sur ce thème ne soient pas faites au niveau institutionnel mais étatique ; autant dire qu’un accord entre les différentes parties est encore incertain eût état du climat actuel des pourparlers.

Quel avenir pour la production Russe de fusils automatiques ?

La production de fusils automatiques par la Russie a connu plusieurs problèmes liés principalement aux contrefaçons mais aussi – et surtout – au manque criant d’innovation. Alors que ses anciens partenaires stratégiques dans ce domaine innovaient à partir des modèles originels délivrés par la Russie sous licence, cette dernière s’enlisait dans la décadence industrielle. Toutefois, récemment, la société Izhmash à pris conscience de ce retard et tente désormais de juguler cette tendance en développant de nouveaux fusils d’assaut, tels le nouveau AK-12, mis en production récemment pour le compte de l’armée russe ; ou le AK-200, encore au stade de prototype avancé. Malgré tout, ces nouveaux prototypes diffèrent en peu de points du design de la Kalachnikov automatique originelle. Certains spécialistes vont jusqu’à dire que ces nouvelles versions ne représentent que des coups de lifting (modules additionnels etc.).

A force de manquer d’innovation dans le secteur de l’armement, la Russie voit depuis plusieurs années ses parts de marché être grignotées, ce qui pourrait lui coûter sa deuxième place d’exportateur d’armes dans les prochaines années. Un cas illustre particulièrement bien cette tendance, celui de l’exportation d’armes vers la Chine. En effet, l’année 2007 a vu une baisse drastique des exportations d’armement russes vers la Chine [SIPRI Policy Paper N°29]. Ceci est dû principalement à deux points. Tout d’abord, la Chine aspire depuis plusieurs années à développer elle-même ses armes légères. En parallèle, l’empire du milieu cherche à importer majoritairement des technologies de pointe lorsqu’il ne peut pas lui-même les développer, afin d’en soutirer les secrets dans le but d’éventuelles copies futures. A terme, on assiste aujourd’hui en Chine à un réel renversement de tendance : hier importatrice nette, cette dernière est désormais une puissance exportatrice majeure dans le domaine de l’armement.

Ainsi, ce n’est pas seulement la Kalachnikov qui s’avère être contrefaite mais bien une large majorité des productions militaires actuelles. Malgré tout il est encore aujourd’hui – très – difficile de comparer les chiffres de la contrefaçon touchant certains secteurs habituellement sous les feux des projecteurs (luxe, drogue, vêtements) et le secteur de l’armement, restreint à un nombre d’initiés où le secret reste l’une des principales barrières.

Je tiens à remercier ER. et GD. pour les nombreuses
informations et corrections apportées à l’article.